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Donostia: Eusko lkaskuntza
1975etik Euskadik aldaketa nabaria izan du jokaera demografikoari dagokionez, ezkontza eta ugalkortasun han-
diak, gero eta adin goiztarragoetan burutuak, aurkezten zituen hedapen-eredu batetik, murriztapen demografikoaren
eredu batera, non ezkontza gutxi eta ugalkortasun kopuru apala, gero eta adin berandukoagoei dagokiena, lehenesten
den. Aldaketa prozesu honen ondorio zuzena ezkontza eta jaiotza kopuruaren beherapena da, %40tan eta %50etan,
hurrenez hurren, 1975-90 bitartean. Garai horretan berean, Ugalkotasun lndize Sintetikoa 2,5etik 0,94ra jaitsi da, eta
biztanleriaren bolumen osoa 2,1 milloitan gelditu da 1980 urtetik.
Ugalkortasunaren eta ezkontzen beheranzko joera horren arrazoia aurkitzerakoan, ez dirudi 70. urteetako erdial-
detik gure Herria jotzen duen krisi ekonomikoaren gogortasunak soilki eragina denik. lzan ere, 1955etik aurrera jaiotako
belaunaldiek, hau da, hezkuntza sistemaren hobekuntzak iritsi zituztenek, irizpide berriak ekarri dituzte familia, ugalke-
ta eta bikote-harremanei dagokienez. Jokabide aldaketa horien artean jeneroen rolak atzemateko era berriak daude,
familian eta gizartean emakumeak duen statusaren ikusmolde berdinzaleagoa, gure gizartearen modernizazio eta
sekularizazio prozesuari loturik daudenak.
Emakumeen esku hartze ekonomikoaren eragina izan da ugalkortasunaren beheranzko joera horren azalpen tra-
dizionala, baina horretan alokairua jasotzen duten, emakumeen partehartzearen garrantzi erreala ez da esan den
bezain handia gertatu, eta horrek, egungo ugalketa-jokabideari gagozkiola, aukera kultural berriek jokatu duten papera
lausotu du.
Desde 1975, Euskadi ha experimentado un cambio de comportamiento demográfico, pasando de un modelo de
expansión basado en nupcialidad y fecundidad altas y a edades cada vez más jóvenes, a un modelo de restricción
demográfica en el que prima la baja nupcialidad y fecundidad y a edades cada vez más tardías. La consecuencia
directa de este proceso de cambio se ha reflejado en la disminucidn del número de matrimonios y el de nacimientos
en un 40% y un 50% respectivamente entre 1975-90. En las mismas fechas el índice Sintético de Fecundidad disminu-
yó de 2,5a 0,94, y el volumen total de población se ha estabiliizado en 2.1 millones desde 1980.
Esta tendencia a la baja de la fecundidad y de la nupcialidad no parece haber sido exclusivamente debida a la
intensidad de la crisis económica que ha sufrido nuesto País desde mediados loS años 70. Las generaciones nacidas
posterior a 1955, es decir, aquellas generaciones que tuvieron acceso a las mejoras del sistema educativo han intro-
ducido nuevas apreciaoones sobre la familia, la reproducción y las relaciones de pareja. Entre estos cambios actitudi-
nales se encuentra una nueva apreciación de los roles de genera, una visión mas igualitaria del status de las mujeres
en la familia y en la sociedad, que están ligadas a su ver al proceso de modernizacidn y secularización de nuestra
sociedad.
La tradicional explicación de este proceso en base al impacto de la participación económica de las mujeres en
la tendencia a la baja de la fecundidad ha participado de la sobreestimación de la importancia real de la participación
asalariada femenina, oscureciendo el papel que han jugado nuevas alternativas culturales en el actual comportamien-
to reproductivo.
Between 1975 and 1990 the Basque Country
1
 has experienced the rapid adaptation of a demographic model
high/y influenced by two decades of fast economic growth (declining ages at marriage, generalized nuptiality and
above replacement level fertility) into its opposite (restricted marriage and at older ages, and below replacement ferti-
lity). In this period the number of marriages declined by 40 percent and the number of births by 60 percent; TFR fell
from 2.5 to 0.94, there is a stab/e negative migration flow and total population oscillates around 2,1 million people since
1980.
However, this declining fertility and nuptiality trends down to the present low levels cannot be considered exclusi-
vely as the result of the intense economic crisis which has swept the area for the last fifteen years. The cohorts born
after 1955, this is, the cohorts with generalized access to better and higher educational standards, have introduced as
well new behavioural patterns with regards union formation and family building.
1. The present analysis is limited to the three Peninsular Basque provinces of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa due
to lack of access to similar data for Nafarroa. However, the graphs 1 to 4 shown on pages 11-12 refer to Census data
for the four territories.
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This new process implies the changing appreciation of traditional gender roles, a more egalitarian position with
regards the status of women within the famliy and in society and appears directly linked lo a parallel secularization
trend. The direct impact of women’s economic participation on the process of ferlility decline has been overestimated,
obscuring the role played by new ideologies of marriage and family building in the promotion, not only of a smaller
famliy size, but also of a wider calendar of reproduction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1975 the Basque Country has experienced a systematic decline of fertility and
nuptiality after two decades of continuous economic and demographic expansion. This trend
has not only implied the deceleration of the pace of demographic behaviour but also affected
the calendar and structure of demographic events. Below replacement fertility was reached
in 1978 and has continued declining since. Fertility decline together with a net migratory out-
flow has generated a process of demographic stagnation in the Basque Country. The gro-
wing presence of alternative models of union and family formation since 1975 have
contributed to this process.
Demographic behaviour is also perceived, at present, as provoked by the current eco-
nomic situation. The consequence of the intense economic crisis which has affected the
Basque Country since the mid 1970s has been a very high level of unemployment. particu-
larly for the younger generations entering the labour market. These cohorts, have adopted a
low fertility model based on late marriage and delayed family formation, alongside permissive
attitudes towards alternative sexual unions.
This presentations attempts to clarify these interrelated aspects of social and fertility
behaviour. The following analysis centers on the role played by the level of women’s econo-
mic participation and the new union and fertility preferences of the younger generations as
the main factors for the stabilization of fertility behaviour at such low levels.
Census and Vital Registration data complemented by information drawn from the 1986
Fertility Survey2 and the 1990 Family Survey3 will be used in this paper.
2. DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: FROM BABY BOOM TO BABY BUST
2.1. Demographic trends before 1975
The expanding economic system of the 1950s and 1960s in Spain concentrated around
the traditional industrial areas of Madrid, Barcelona and the Basque Country paving the way
for a massive population movement from the rural or less industrialized areas into the gro-
2. ‘Demografiako eta balidazioko inkesta 1986 Encuesta demográfica y de validación’, EUSTAT, Vitoria-Gasteiz,
1989. Marriage and Fertility Survey attached to the 1986 municipal enumeration providing informatlon on the demo-
graphic history of women aged over 15 in fifteen thousand households.
3. Survey on ‘Women, Family and Domestic sphere’ to 1300 women and 425 men aged 16-70, sponsored by the
Women’s Institute of the Basque Country, EMAKUNDE, in 1990.
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wing industrial centers, reestablishing the migratory patterns of late 19th and early 20th cen-
tury. The intensity of this process led to the depopulation of vast areas in central Spain in only
one generation (Tezanos, 1985).
The industrial areas of the Basque Country became again a pole of attraction for a popu-
lation who flowed continuously from the early 1950s until the mid 1970s. The net input of
immigration was to account for half of the intercensal population gains between 1950 and
1970 and for 35 percent of the gains between 1970 and 19754. As a result the younger
generations increased to the extent that some cohorts almost doubled their initial numbers in
twenty years5), especially in the 1960s. The age structure became, thus heavily overrepresen-
ted by men and women in their reproductive years, which helped to accelerate the number of
marriages and births during that period.
The secular trend towards fertility decline experienced since the beginning of the cen-
tury6 came to a halt. By 1960 period indicators showed a return to a high fertility model cen-
tered on younger age intervals of the reproductive span, process which continued well into
the 1970s. Similarly to other European countries, but with a decade of delay, the Basque
Country experienced its ‘baby boom’. The overrepresented younger generations not only
introduced a more dynamic pattern of marriages and births, but they also introduced a new
structure and calendar of nuptiality and fertility.
The traditional nuptiality model based on high levels of celibacy and of late age at
marriage gave way to a higher frequency of marriage and at younger ages. The age at first
and higher order births declined, promoting a significant increase of period fertility. Extra
marital fertility stayed at very moderate levels (under 2 percent of all births), maintaining the
close relationship between marriage and fertility common to Southern Europe. This new pat-
tern of period fertility behaviour fits the trends experier ced in Western Europe in the previous
decade: age specific fertility increased in all age intervals, but mainly at ages under 30 (see
Table 1).
From the mid 1950s onwards the fertility of women over 30 declined, specially of women
over 40, in contrast with the increasing fertility of women under 25 (particularly of those under
20 which became a characteristic feature of the period). The traditional model of late and
widespread childbearing gave way to a new system which inaugurated a pattern of fertility
behaviour highly concentrated on the youngest age groups. Marriage at age 25-29 age con-
tinued to be the most frequent age for marriage but frequency of marriage at younger ages
(20-24) increased at the expense of nuptiality at ages over 30, thus lowering the mean age at
marriage (see Table 2). Besides, the age difference between spouses declined by one year
during the 1960-75 period.
2.2. Demographic trends after 1975
However, this new trend did not last long. By 1975 period fertility was declining in all age
groups but the youngest, decline which was to become particularly intense by the end of the
4. The four census since 1970 indicate that 30 to 35 percent of the Basque population has been born elsewhere.
5. As it happened for the group aged 5-14 in 1950 which continued‘to receive population in the 1970s.
6. The onset of the demographic transition for the Peninsular Basque area was in the 1920s (Coale & Watkins,
1986).
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* Standardized men age at marriage (SMAM, Hajnal 1956) during the period shown in the first line.
* * Mean age of people marrying during the period shown in the first column.
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decade and affecting women of all ages. This declining trend has persisted into the present
without showing any signs of change. Replacement level was reached for the first time in
1978 and the decline has continued ever since reaching a current minimum of 0.94, less than
a third of what it was two decades previously.
This new trend has affected fertility at all ages, although with different intensity depen-
ding on calendar. What started as a process of concentrating fertility at younger groups of
women has turned into the opposite in the 1980s, becoming an experience increasingly rela-
ted to women in the medium interval of the reproductive span (30 to 40 years of age). In the
last five years, and for the first time since the early sixties, the fertility of women aged 30 to 34
is the highest of all groups, with the fertility of the 35-39 age group approaching that of the
20-24s. During the last decade declining fertility has affected older age groups less than
women under 30, suggesting that the main bulk of fertility is geared to complete the family
size rather than to initiate it. Currently, the fertility at age 20-24 is a third of what used to be a
decade ago, and that at age 25-29 has declined by more than half (see Table 1).
The age specific nuptiality rates (number of first marriages in a cohort to the number of
women in that cohort) have also declined spectacularly. Only 20 percent of the women born
in 1966-70 married at the age of 20-24 in comparison with the 63 percent of the 1956-60
cohort married at the same age, or the 73 percent married of those 20-24 years old born in
1951-55. The downward fertility trend and at older ages during the 1980s is obviously linked
to the declining tendency to marry at young ages. SMAMS which had lowered 2 years in
women and 3 in men between 1960 and 1975, have increased 4 years since 1960 and by
more than two in the last ten (see Table 2).
The ‘baby bust’ period of fertility decline common to most Western Europe during the
1970s and early 1980s also emphasized new developments in demographic behaviour.
Marriage has ceased to be the exclusive reference for a sexual union, nor the only one for
reproduction. At the same time it has ceased to be a union for life and the probability of
experiencing more than one stable unions has increased. However, the role played by the
increasing levels of consensual unions and of family building in this context, as well as of
marital breakdown is relatively unimportant in the Basque Country. These trends have been
established late and only moderately.
The extent of cohabitation was measured for the first time in the 1986 Fertility Survey.
According to it the impact of cohabitation is low, with only 0,9 percent of the women in their
reproductive period in this category. The majority of the consensual unions (83,5 percent)
appear highly concentrated on women born after 1951 which were at most 35 at the time of
the survey. In most Western countries these unions act as a waiting period to marriage and
family initiation, and tend to be particularly high at ages under 24 and to decline later on
(Schwarz, 1988). In the Basque case, consensual unions concentrate at ages over 25.
However, in a similar pattern to late nuptiality, the low level of cohabitation is reflected by the
fact that in 1986 only 3 percent of the women aged 25-34 were in this category, a low propor-
tion in comparison to the recent behaviour of women of similar age in other West European
countries (Kiernan, 1989), such as the United Kingdom (6% in 1979), France (7% in 1981),
Netherlands (14% in 1982), and very far away from the experience of Denmark (34% in 1981)
or Sweden (45% in 1981). Marital breakdown is also a limited occurrence in our area, since
only 1,5 percent of women of reproductive age indicate that they are divorced or separated
(legally or de facto).
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The level of decohabitation from the parental family has declined for the generation born
after 1955, reflecting the widespread youth unemployment during the 1980s and the conse-
quent longer economic dependency on the family. This behaviour is furthermore legitimized
by the tradition of staying in the family of origin till marriage takes place. The proportion of
extramarital births has increased from a low 3,2 percent in 1975 to the current moderate 7,4
percent in 1990, with the age structure of single motherhood following a similar trend to that
of general fertility. The proportion of extramarital births to women over 25 is growing, displa-
cing the importance of these births to women aged under 24.
As has been mentioned before, the slow introduction of these new models of nuptiality
and fertility behaviour in our society contrast with the current levels of these trends in most of
Western Europe. Their impact cannot does not have a significant influence in this recent pro-
cess of fertility decline. Even so, this moderate inroad in alternative demographic behaviour
suggests that the continuing stability and centrality of marriage and the family as the funda-
mental frame of reference for union formation and reproduction is slowly being eroded.
3. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND FAMILY FORMATION
3.1. The economic position of women
Declining fertility trends are traditionally linked both, to the economic situation and to the
levels of women’s participation in the labour market. Even at times of economic expansion,
women’s economic participation has been traditionally low in the Basque Country. In Western
Europe the expansion of the Service Sector and the widespread introduction of part time
work in the 1960s induced a significant increase in the labour participation of women with
dependant children by allowing them a better compromise between a professional job and
domestic responsibilities. This trend has been rather limited in the Basque case. Labour
Social costs were fixed irrespective of time worked till very recently making part time work
particularly expensive and therefore, not competitive for employers. In addition, the Basque
Country has specialized in heavy industry (steel and metal manufactures) and job opportu-
nities for women have been curtailed by the slow growth of the service sector until the 1980s.
Up to the 1970s and for three and a half decades, the labour market was characterized
by a rigid structure, with a production system which combined job stability with very low sala-
ries. The generalization of the full time working shift in most trades and the social belief that
family responsibilities were the exclusive scope of married women induced an exaggeratedly
picked ‘L’ pattern of participation in the economy for women aged 20-24 during the 1960s
and 1970s. Women’s economic activity was highest before marriage and dropped to
insignificant levels after the first child. This trend smoothed with time and levels of education
so that after 1981 dropping out of the job because of marriage or childbearing became much
less common (see figures 1 to 47).
7. The rates shown in figures 1 to 4 refer to the four historical regions of the Peninsular Basque Country, i.e.
Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (which form the present Basque Autonomous Community) plus Navarre. No major pro-
blems of comparability arise as the sociodemographic structure is rather homogeneous in the four areas. Furthermore,
Navarre represents under 20 percent of the total population.
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Figure 1. Figure 2
Figure 3. Figure 4.
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In the last decades women’s economic participation has experienced a positive trend,
growing progressively at all ages of women irrespective of civil status and educational level;
although, as expected, women’s rates of economic activity remained highest in single women
and in women with the highest educational level. One paradox of this situation lies in the fact
that the access to higher educational levels during the 1980s has increased the offer of bet-
ter educated women in the labour market at a time when the economic possibilities for
employment were declining.
The generalized crisis of the mid 1970s ends the situation of virtual full employment
experienced since the 1950s. At this point the fragile Spanish economic system was badly
affected by the international economic crisis which together with the social turmoil of the poli-
tical transition from Francoism generate a collapse of the previous accelerated growth pro-
cess As a consequence, the previous gains regarding job stability began to crumble. Since
1977 the growing intensity of selective unemployment has been a characteristic of Basque
society. Unemployment has been most intense at both extremes of the age pyramid: on the
youngest actives and the oldest workers. It made a full impact on the younger generations
impeding their entrance into an occupation and these were cohorts of women and men
ready to integrate in the labour market and to initiate themselves into family forming. On the
other extreme of the age structure it witnessed the widespread introduction of early retire-
ment schemes (down to 50 years of age in some cases) served to smooth the impact of
unemployment.
Total employment which followed a growing trend since the 1950s declined sharply
after 1975 losing over 10 per cent in the 1975-86 period, returning to the employment levels
of 1970. Given the nature of the crisis, which affected mainly the industrial and steel related
sectors, these job losses have affected mainly the male occupational market (between 1975
and 1985, a decline of 16 per cent of the male jobs) while the number of female jobs have
increased by 14 per cent, although the relation of women to men in employment is still 1 to 3.
The economic recovery experienced in the Basque area in 1986-89 has improved the gene-
ral levels of employment increasing noticeably the number of women employed while men’s
economic participation declined and their number of jobs stabilized (see Table 3).
The temporary growth employment after 1985 reflects the international economic reco-
very and is particularly strong for the Spanish economy, partly due to the inflow of foreign
capital linked with the entrance in the European Community. The Basque industry, extremely
dependant on the Spanish market, reflects this upsurge of activity and grows at a pace unk-
nown since the early 1970s. However this growing access of women to employment does not
keep the pace with the trend of economic activity, and the proportion of women unemployed
has increased by 42 per cent since 1980. This increase in women’s economic activity has
been due to the growing incorporation of women over 25 into the labour market, while the fall
in men’s is basically related to their earlier exit from the labour market due to the introduction
of pre retirement schemes. Between 1983 and 1988, the activity rate of men over 54 decrea-
sed from 42.7 to 31.7 per cent.
Youth activity (16-25 age interval) declined during this period affecting both sexes
evenly. This trend was highly influenced by the increase in the school leaving age conse-
quence of two interrelated factors: on the one hand, the structural trend towards higher pro-
fessional specialization (which in practice implies larger period of schooling) and, on the
other, to the difficulties in finding employment which kept the younger population at school.
These two groups, women and youth, who play a secondary position in the labour market are
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Table 3.
Table 4.
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more sensible to its fluctuations than the rest: this is specially applicable to women whose
economic activity rates declined in the early 1980s due to ‘discouragement’ induced by
increasing unemployment rates and increased rapidly after 1987 with the decline of the
general level of unemployment. However, during this later period of economic recovery the
trend of reentry into the labour market was also highly gender asymmetrical: while the
unemployment rate for men declined from 21,3 to 14 per cent between 1985 and 1989, the
unemployment rate for women remained stable at 30 per cent (see Table 4).
Cohort analysis of the evolution of economic participation of men and women clearly
indicate the extent of the difficulties of the younger generations for entrance in the labour
market and employment. As indicated before, unemployment has been highly selective of
women and men at the youngest age groups, and it is precisely the economic situation of
these younger cohorts which is relevant for the demographic evolution. In this sense, period
fertility decline since 1975 has been fundamentally due to the fertility decline of the cohorts
born after 1955-60. These are also the same generations of women and men which have
been hit hardest by unemployment since 1975, since one in every four men economically
active aged 26-30 and one in every two men aged 21-25 in 1986 were unemployed. The
rates for women were even more discouraging.
The rates of employment of young men and women, which integrate the effects both of
participation and unemployment, ratify the process described above. In 1986, two thirds of
the men and three fourths of the women aged 21-25 (and over a quarter of the men and half
of the women aged 26-30) had not got independent means of livelihood. The economic
improvements of 1986-89 have not been enough to redress the negative economic expec-
tations on the future. In this sense, given the subsidiary position of women in relation to
employment, even if gender differences in activity and employment rates in the younger
cohorts are closing up, the possibilities for union and family formation will depend, primarily,
on the position of men in the labour market.
3.2. Fertility behaviour and economic activity
If the evolution of women’s participation in the labour market as indicated by the trend of
economic activity rates is inversely related to fertility trends, demographic and economic
indicators would have to reflect this relationship. Female activity rates are low in the 1960s
and early 1970s, coinciding with the years of highest period fertility, and increase systemati-
tally in the late 1970s and early 1980s in parallel to the dramatic declines in period fertility.
However, labour participation of women since 1975 has never been high enough or decisive
enough to influence by themseives the trend of fertility downwards.
In this way, the influence of socioeconomic conditions on fertility varies both by marriage
cohort and socioeconomic group. The oscillations found in fertility behaviour by socioecono-
mic condition do not help to clarify the expected relationship between fertility and econo-
mic activity in women. As expected, the fertility of never active women is systematically
above the fertility of ever active women in all cohorts. However, achieved fertility in some of
the economically active groups can be higher than the never actives. This is clearly seen
when comparing the percent differences in fertility between groups (see Table 5).
The percent differences in the mean number of children detween the two groups along
time suggest the development of two different fertility trends related, more to the marriage
age cohort (and therefore to age) than to economic activity. The cohorts married before 1956
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show a maximum 10 per cent difference in fertility between economically actives and never
active women (positive to never active women) while for the women married after 1950, the
fertility differences between the two groups decline by more than half oscillating moderately
between 1.7 and 4.4 per cent (see Table 6).
On the other hand, the fertility fluctuations within the ever active group by socioeconom-
ic situations are important enough, given that the unskilled workers (who represent the lar-
gest group of economically active women) show a mean fertility closer to the never actives
than to most other socioeconomic categories. Similarly, maximum fertility variations by
marriage cohort are far wider within each socioeconomic group than between groups.
According to this, fertility decline has been more decisive in the never active group (-18.7
percent) than in the ever active (-11.2 percent). Furthermore this fertility decline has been
similar to that experienced by the skilled workers (- 18.5 percent) and larger than the fertility
decline of the unskilled workers (-15.2 percent).
This would suggest that extraeconomic reasons contribute significantly to the trend of
declining fertility in the Basque Country. It would be expected that the improvements in the
standard of education, secularization and social diffusion played as well a relevant role in
intergenerational change and cultural homogenization contributing to the convergence of the
fertility patterns irrespective of economic roles in women.
4. SECULARIZATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE
Taking into account the previous economic and fertility background, the current low ferti-
lity situation appears as a logical consequence to economic depression. However, linked to
this process there is also the changing attitudes towards marriage and family formation (spe-
Table 5.
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cially significant in the younger generations of women and men) which have paved the way
for a very restrictive demographic model which in the Basque case seems to have taken
place at a minimum personal cost.
In a cultural model of fertility change (Lesthaeghe, 1986) a new system of values and
attitudes in relation to family forming and building is as important for the understanding of fer-
tility decline as economic considerations are. Each cohort experiences an individualized pro-
cess of socialization, the background against which demographic decisions are made. In this
model, religiosity appears as the largest discriminatory aspect between cohorts by age and
sex, so that secularization becomes the main ideological dimension of change between
generations: highest secularization will be attached to the younger and more educated
cohorts as opposed to the more traditionally religious older cohorts, each group showing a
different demographic fertility behaviour.
According to this framework of reference, the generations which produced the baby
boom in Western Europe had idealized values not markedly different from those of their
parents, They ascribed to the older models of family formation but they did not transmit them
to the younger generations which were secularized in a spirit of greater individualism and cri-
ticism of authority whether social or religious. They were also the generations who demanded
better educational, social and economic opportunities for women, or the need for more relia-
ble contraceptive methods and in this way, spread the bases of an alternative reference
model on the family.
The application of this framework of analysis to the Basque case seems relevant since
the impact of religious influence in the individual, family and social life has declined sharply
in the last twenty years in parallel to the evolution of fertility. The 1977 and the 1985 Spanish
National Fertility Surveys already indicated a large fall in women’s religious practice during
Table 6.
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that period (from 85 to 59 per cent), showing as well the lack of impact of religious practice
on family formation and contraceptive behaviour (Arregi, 1989). According to the 1991 Family
Survey the importance of religion in the individual, family and social life has continued decli-
ning, with 53 per cent of women and 40 per cent of men considering themselves practicing
Catholics nowadays (the presence of other religious being practically insignificant). This dimi-
nishing impact of religion is also reflected by the growing importance of civil marriage,
almost non existent before 1975 and which has progressed to represent 2 per cent of all
marriages in 1990.
This pattern of secularization and ideological change is also clear in the position of
parents faced to alternative sexual unions to marriage or premarital cohabitation before
marriage in their children, according to the 1991 Family Survey. Traditional ideology of the
family with regard marriage rites and union formation remain strong on married people over
45 years of age (87.8 per cent of men and 81.7 per cent of women), who would not change
their type of union or rite of celebration nowadays, in contrast with the election in the younger
group of single people (under 30) whose preferences for religious marriage are less frequent
(to 43 per cent of men and 47.7 per cent of women). At the same time the level of permissive-
ness in older people with the behaviour of their children in relation to alternative sexual rela-
tionship and unions is quite striking. It suggests an increasing tolerance in the older
generations with regards non traditional attitudes towards family formation, even if they do
not apply it to themselves. Parents sanctioned positively the new behavioural preferences of
the younger generations in contrast to the rigid ideology of the Catholic Church for women
and family formation, and in spite of their own more traditional values.
In this Survey (see Table 7), over eighty percent of men and women under 35 approved
cohabitation before marriage in their children, and the approval would fall slightly when con-
sidering consensual unions. Permissiveness regarding homosexuality is lower, declining to
under half of the sample the level of approval in both sexes. Similar evolution can be found in
the opinions related to fertility control, decohabitation, union formation and women’s econo-
mic position. Women and men under thirty five profess a more egalitarian position than older
people in all items, and show a far stronger tolerance for decisions on childlessness or divor-
ce. So intergenerational differences are a constant in all the statements, however, once again
maximum percent differences (between 30 to 35 points) can be found in questions of beha-
viour related to religious practice or beliefs (i.e. celebration of religious marriage), alternative
union behaviour and on the items on abortion.
Attitudes are more similar in the statements on job adequation by sex, or the importance
of women’s unemployment by civil status and in relation to men, but less gender egalitarian.
The generalized assumption of gender differentiation by task in all ages suggests that both
women and men perceive their main activities in sex exclusive spheres. Underlining this fact,
the importance given in the younger groups (43 percent) to single women’s unemployment
situation over married women’s asserts the notion that married women’s position is conside-
red subsidiary to their husband’s within the family. These opinions reflect the difficulties
found in an otherwise fairly tolerant society for gender equality in economic matters during
periods of unemployment. The greater importance attached to men jobs arises from the daily
economic reality in which men jobs are fundamental for the survival of the family group.
According to a cultural model of fertility decline, this ideological change over family buil-
ding and organization would reflect the reaction of the cohorts who lived through the institu-
tionally pronatalist and traditional family normative (enforced during thirty five years of
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authoritarianism) and the determination not to socialize the younger generations in the same
way even if they themselves have subscribed to the traditional model of family forming. This
in fact presupposes a complete ideological and political break with the past in values, norms
and attitudes.
In this sense, something should be explained in relation to the political nature of the
state previous to 1976 and how it could have affected the process of socialization of the
younger generations. Most of the demographic indicators used refer to the year 1975 as a
sort of frontier, and this is so because the dictatorship under which Spain had been living
until that moment showed a marked predilection for the protection of the most traditional
values regarding women and the family. This predilection was both ideological and legal,
was still present in 1975 although the social cleavages linked with the accelerated process of
industrialization and urbanization of the 1960s had significantly weakened its relevance. The
legal changes which have taken place have affected both the Penal Law (lifting of the status
of criminal offense attached to adultery and cohabitation, and the restrictions on the sale of
birth control methods, in 1978) and the Civil Code (with the approval of the Divorce Law8 in
1981, and of the Abortion Law in 19869.
In this sense it could be said that the year of 1975, marked the beginning of the end of a
legally endorsed conservative tradition which stressed the role of Catholic religion and ethics
in public and private life, and the role of women within the family, and her primary dedication
to family forming. It meant the end of a normative behavior, already changing in the younger
generations, but which had not found a generalized public expression till that moment.
However, most measurements on cohabitation, efficient contraception, voluntary inte-
rruption of pregnancies (VIP), or even marital dissolution underestimate current behaviour.
For example, the official statistics on VIP leave out all those cases of abortion on demand in
the private sector and abroad, (the corrected figure would enable us to understand current
fertility levels in spite of low levels of efficient contraception).
5. CONCLUSION
The swift adaptation to a low geared demographic system in the Basque Country stands
out as product of interrelated experiences of ideological, cultural and economic nature,
which can be dated with precision. Several trends stand out in this process. The first is the
generalized impact of secularization, indicated by the rapid fall in the levels of religious prac-
tice. The second is the ideology of low fertility and alternative union formation, paramount in
those younger generations which participated directly in the process of demographic stagna-
tion. And the third, is the full impact of the economic crisis on these generations hampering
their access to employment and therefore to economic independence.
8. Divorce is only granted after a two year waiting period of legal separation. In practice legal separations could
be added up to divorces, whose impact is, at present, very small.
9. The Law on Abortion passed during the second Socialist Government is, fundamentally, a therapeutic law. It
allows for a legal interruption of pregnancy (LIP) in cases of rape, damage to the physical or psychological well being
of the mother, and of malformation of the foetus. In 1989 there were 1536 LIPS in the Basque Country, 70 per cent con-
centrated in ages 20-34.
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However, would the economy recover and the employment level of these generations
improve, a moderate growth first in nuptiality and later in fertility could be expected. This is
suggested by the halt in the decline of the number of marriages which followed the economic
recovery of the 1986-89 period. Nevertheless, the intensity and duration of the economic cri-
sis will impede a substantial number of these generations to initiate or complete the family
size they might initially have desired.
Throughout this process, and also as consequence of a highly gender differentiated
labour market, women’s economic position remains weak and economically dependant of eit-
her family or partner. This situation has remained so in spite of the progressive levelling of
educational attainment between the sexes in the younger population.
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